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The first week of law school is for most students an intimidating experience. 
Everyone is so serious. My first week was leavened considerably by Harry 
Kalven. A group of students and Kalven were watching the seventh game of 
the 1964 World Series in the student lounge of the University of Chicago Law 
School. The broadcast was interrupted by a news bulletin: Nikita Khrushchev 
had just been deposed. Viewers were treated to several minutes of political 
and diplomatic analysis, with correspondents around the globe speculating 
on what this might mean for East-West relations. One of my classmates, an 
amateur Kremlinologist no doubt, expressed surprise: “I can’t understand 
why they would do this now.” Kalven agreed: “Yeah, in the seventh inning.” 
Though well liked and greatly respected, Harry Kalven was not the most 
popular teacher in the law school during my time as a student. Some classmates 
thought his classes moved too slowly, that he belabored and repeated points. 
Everyone warmed to his wit, his imagination, and his generous spirit, but 
not everyone found in Kalven’s classes the crackling intellectual tension, the 
rigor, the sense of analytic closure that some other teachers provided. By any 
measure Kalven was a good, effective teacher. But was he a great one?
For me, he was more than a great teacher. He was a unique force in my 
education. He remains a continuing force. Other former students—practicing 
lawyers, law teachers, law school graduates who have made careers outside of 
law—tell me the same thing. His ideas stick in the mind; his personal example 
continues to lead. His teaching has stood the test. He seems an even better 
teacher now than he did at the time. 
All the more remarkable is Kalven’s staying power when one considers that 
he was quintessentially a man of his times, an observer, a writer and teacher 
who was at his best when responding. He wrote mostly about recent cases and 
issues of current public controversy. His thought seemed always in progress, 
constantly on the lookout for more facts and better formulations. Kalven was 
interested in theories and produced a number of theoretical insights, but neither 
in the classroom nor in his writings did he offer anything like a systematic, 
well-elaborated personal perspective. He was the most creative legal thinker I 
have known, but his scholarship was patently, proudly, derivative. He was not, 
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and did not try to be, a definitive thinker. Nor was he a forceful personality. He 
was the antithesis of a self-promoter. And yet he left his mark on his field and 
on his students in a way that few professors ever do.
The word that best describes Harry Kalven is “inquisitive.” To him learning 
was a joyous, almost playful activity—not a chore, not a source of power or 
distinction, more an experience than a quest. His inquisitive mind observed 
no boundaries; he never became a prisoner of his own expertise. His work as 
a scholar was unforced.
Kalven’s love of exploration is one reason, I think, why his closest 
professional companions were other teachers at heart, most notably Walter 
Blum, Charles Gregory, and Alexander Meiklejohn. What other lifelong liberal 
could have written the book Kalven co-authored with Blum, The Uneasy Case for 
Progressive Taxation?1 It says much about their character that two colleagues with 
such divergent political convictions could have collaborated so successfully on 
an inquiry that touches a major nerve of the liberal-conservative divide. That 
Blum and Kalven were able to bridge their differences and jointly advance 
a bold critique on a sensitive subject probably traces to the fact that, for all 
their scholarly accomplishments, these virtuosos of the classroom were first 
and foremost teachers. The book’s insouciant, unscripted analysis suggests 
that both authors brought to the project a pedagogic agenda: to learn, to test, 
to provoke, to embarrass dogma. 
In Kalven’s work with Gregory, the creative synergy that spawned a 
remarkably user-friendly yet insidiously demanding torts casebook2 was 
enriched by a shared sense of humor. Gregory’s account of a Kalven prank 
well captures the fun they had as torts teachers:
Harry visited me in Charlottesville when I was recovering from an illness. Our 
lawn needed cutting badly, and Harry volunteered. He got the power mower 
going (mirabile dictum) and went at it industriously, for we had a big lawn. After 
some time I looked out from an upstairs window and saw that right in the 
middle of the lawn Harry had cut, in huge letters, the word “CARDOZO.” 
How could I help adoring a guy who would do that to make me feel better?3 
Kalven always considered himself a student of Meiklejohn, though he never 
took a course from the legendary teacher and philosopher of education. The 
special quality of their relationship comes across in remarks each made about 
the other. Meiklejohn introduced his most important law review article by 
explaining:
1. Published initially as a law review article. See Walter Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy 
Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. Chi. L. Rev. 417 (1952) reprinted as University of Chicago 
Law School Reprint and Pamphlet Series No. 11.  
2. Charles O. Gregory & Harry Kalven, Jr., Cases and Materials on Torts (1st ed. Little, Brown 
1959).
3. Charles O. Gregory, Harry Kalven: Scholar and Friend, 43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 8 (1975).
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The writing of this paper is largely due to the friendly insistence of Professor 
Harry Kalven, Jr. of the Law School of the University of Chicago. He and I 
have had, in recent years, a continuing exchange of ideas. Professor Kalven 
tells me that he is not sure that my interpretation of the First Amendment can 
stand the test of lawyer-like application to the many specific situations which 
the courts must handle.4
In turn, Kalven ended his most important law review article, asserting 
the historic importance of New York Times v. Sullivan, by reporting that he had 
discussed the case with the 92-year-old Meiklejohn shortly after it was decided:
It is perhaps a fitting postscript to say that I had occasion this summer to 
discuss the Times case with Mr. Meiklejohn. Before I had disclosed my own 
views, I asked him for his judgment of the Times case. “It is,” he said, “an 
occasion for dancing in the streets.” As always, I am inclined to think he is 
right.5
In his memorial tribute to Meiklejohn, Kalven emphasized his mentor’s gift 
for making learning enjoyable:
I have always suspected that Socrates, however wise and admirable, would 
have made a trying and difficult companion. “Alec” was a Socrates who wore 
well, a Socrates it was fun to be with, a Socrates for all seasons.6
Not only Kalven’s collaborators but also his intellectual adversaries 
appreciated the love of give and take that he brought to his work. Here is 
Guido Calabresi (another born teacher) describing what it was like to begin 
his career by matching wits with Kalven:
In 1960 I walked into an office at The University of Chicago Law School. 
There I found Walter Blum and Harry Kalven. They had just read a draft of 
what was to become my first article. Harry greeted me with: “it’s all wrong 
. . . but I wish I had written an article like that when I was your age!” This 
began the debate. Blum and Kalven delivered the Shulman Lectures at Yale, 
Public Law Perspectives on a Private Law Problem—Auto Compensation Plans. I struck 
4. Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 246 
n.4.
5. Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case: A Note on The Central Meaning of the First 
Amendment, 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev.191, 221 n.225 [hereinafter Kalven, Jr., The New York Times 
Case].
6. Adam R. Nelson, Education and Democracy: The Meaning of Alexander Meiklejohn, 1872–
1964 330 (Univ. of Wis. Press, 2001).
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back in Fault, Accidents, and the Wonderful World of Blum and Kalven; but they had 
the last laugh in The Empty Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi. I believe that the law of torts 
benefitted from that hard fought polemic. I know that I, as a young scholar, 
could not have had a tougher, or more loving, initiation to scholarship.7 
Kalven wrote and taught on a diverse range of legal subjects. His first major 
scholarly achievement was in the field of civil procedure, a 1941 article that was 
ahead of its time in appreciating the potential significance of the class action 
lawsuit.8 In addition to their book on progressive taxation and their running 
debate with Calabresi, Blum and Kalven produced critiques of many of the 
modern “no-fault” reform proposals for compensating victims of automobile 
accidents.9 Kalven published articles on a number of other tort topics,10 even as 
the casebook he co-edited with Charles Gregory remained the preferred forum 
for presenting his ideas about torts. With Hans Zeisel and others he conducted 
an ambitious empirical study of jury behavior.11 A valuable by-product of the 
jury study was a series of reflections by Kalven on the use of social science 
methods in the study of legal problems and institutions.12 Toward the end of 
his life, he taught a seminar on slavery. He was never superficial and he was 
frequently penetrating. But he liked to move on, to explore fresh terrain. 
One legal subject, however, engaged him more completely and more 
continuously than any other. Harry Kalven never tired of thinking about 
the freedom of speech and he never ran out of fresh, important things to 
say about the subject. Thirty-seven years after his death, in some cases more 
than fifty years after initial publication, his writings on obscenity,13 legislative 
7. Guido Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 
43 U. Chi. L. Rev. 69 (1975).
8. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Maurice Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 684 (1941).
9. See Walter Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., Ceilings, Cost, and Compulsions in Auto Compensation 
Legislation, 1973 Utah L. Rev. 341 (1973); Walter Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., A Stopgap Plan 
for Compensating Auto Accident Victims, 1968 Ins. L. J. 661 (1968); Harry Kalven, Jr., A 
Schema of Alternatives to the Present Auto Accident Tort System, 1 Conn. L. Rev. 33 (1968).
10. See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., Comparative v. Contributory Negligence: Should the Court or 
the Legislature Decide?, in Symposium on Maki v. Frelk, 21 Vand. L. Rev. 897 (1968); Harry 
Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law—Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 Law & Contemp. 
Probs. 326 (1966); Harry Kalven, Jr., Torts: The Quest for Appropriate Standards, 53 Calif. 
L. Rev. 189 (1965); Harry Kalven, Jr., Mr. Justice Holmes: Some Modern Views—Torts, 31 
U. Chi. L. Rev. 263 (1964); Harry Kalven, Jr., Strict Liability, 9 Loy. L. Rev. 31 (1958); Harry 
Kalven, Jr., The Jury, the Law, and the Personal Injury Damage Award, 19 Ohio St. L.J. 158 
(1958).
11. See Harry Kalven, Jr. & Hans Zeisel, The American Jury (Little, Brown 1966); Hans Zeisel, 
Harry Kalven, Jr., and Bernard Buchholz, Delay in the Court (Little, Brown 1959).
12. See Harry Kalven, Jr., Toward a Science of Impartial Judicial Behavior, 42 U. Cin. L. Rev. 
(1973); Harry Kalven, Jr., Some Comments on the Law and Behavioral Science Project at the 
University of Pennsylvania, 11 J. Legal Educ. 94 (1958). 
13. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
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investigations into political beliefs,14 street demonstrations,15 and libel16 remain 
the classic texts from which almost all subsequent work takes off. Two entries 
on the short list of important concepts in the modern law of free speech, the 
“public forum” and the “heckler’s veto,” were first identified (and memorably 
named) in Kalven writings.17 His article on New York Times v. Sullivan greatly 
shaped the way that case has been understood ever since. Kalven transformed 
the Times precedent into much more than a holding about libel law simply 
by spotlighting and celebrating three features of Justice Brennan’s majority 
opinion: its analogizing of a libel suit by a public official to the infamous 
criminal prosecutions under the Sedition Act of 1798,18 its assertion that the 
First Amendment has a “central meaning,”19 and its discovery of “a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be 
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.”20
It is a fitting tribute to the devotion Kalven could inspire that his major 
book on the First Amendment, A Worthy Tradition, left unfinished at his death 
in 1974, was painstakingly and perceptively brought to completion by his son 
Jamie. This editing project, assisted by Kalven’s former colleague Owen Fiss, 
extended over fourteen years. Jamie, like his father a gifted writer but as a 
journalist rather than a lawyer or scholar, achieved an expert’s command of 
the intricate law of the First Amendment, consulted student notes from his 
father’s classes (a nationwide call for old notebooks went out), then tested 
and sharpened his editorial judgments in several workshops before major law 
faculties. Astonishingly, the book suffers hardly at all from the circumstances 
of its authorship. It is a contemporary book, one that challenges and inspires 
today’s students of the First Amendment.
What explains Harry Kalven’s striking capacity to live on in the minds of 
his students and readers? I believe he remains influential because he had an 
uncanny ability to engender creativity in others—in his students, in his readers, 
even I would guess in his collaborators. Driven by a genuine curiosity, he 
tried to enlist those around him in the search. To sit in a Kalven classroom 
was to be a participant, not an auditor. I was called on to recite only a handful 
14. Harry Kalven, Jr. & Roscoe Steffen, The Bar Admission Cases: An Unfinished Debate 
Between Justice Harlan and Justice Black, 21 Law in Transition 155 (1961); Harry Kalven, Jr., 
Mr. Alexander Meiklejohn and the Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U. Chi. L. Rev. 315 (1960).
15. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
16. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 
1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 267; Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case, supra note 5. 
17. See Kalven, Jr., supra note 15, at 10–21 (public forum); Harry Kalven, Jr., The Negro and the 
First Amendment 140–41 (1965) (heckler’s veto); Harry Kalven, Jr., A Worthy Tradition 89-
91 (1988) (heckler’s veto).
18. Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case, supra note 5, at 205–9.
19. Id. at 208.
20. Id. at 212; see also Harry Kalven, Jr., “Uninhibited, Robust, and Wide-Open”–A Note on Free 
Speech and the Warren Court, 67 Mich. L. Rev. 289 (1968). 
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of times, but in my mind I formulated hundreds of answers—and hundreds 
of questions as well—as I observed him conversing with other students. 
Similarly, reading a Kalven article or book is a participatory experience. One 
is constantly “revising” the analysis, adding new applications or refinements, 
imagining objections and responding to them. I suppose most teachers and 
authors seek this effect; few actually aspire to have the last word. But Kalven 
was extraordinary in his capacity to converse about law productively with 
persons far less knowledgeable and insightful than himself, and in the process 
raise them toward his level. 
Exactly how does an inspiring teacher induce his students to probe and 
create on their own? Is it simply by force of personal example? Or are there 
techniques? Can someone not blessed with a mind so fertile as Kalven’s 
nonetheless have the pedagogic impact that he had? As a teacher who would 
love to do for my students what he did for me, I have pondered these questions 
for years.
Certainly one secret to Kalven’s success was his utter lack of intellectual 
pretense or arrogance. He wore his considerable erudition lightly. In matters 
of the mind he did not seek to separate himself from others. Just the reverse. 
He was intellectually gregarious and serendipitous. He did not believe that 
all ideas or traditions or minds were equal—he had high standards, deep 
commitments, and heroes—but he did believe that persons with no special 
expertise or ability pertinent to the topic at hand could contribute to his 
understanding, and not just to his understanding of them. In his writing and 
teaching he lavished attention on the reasoning of judges whose talents were 
modest and whose opinions he could easily have savaged. I doubt whether 
any modern legal scholar has been so generous as he was in discussing judicial 
opinions. And I do not think his intellectual generosity was a product of 
personal kindness, deference to authority, or an aversion to confrontation. He 
was generous with the thought of others because he believed he could learn 
best by appreciating and building upon the ideas that moved ordinary people. 
In fact, Harry Kalven’s distinctive understanding of the First Amendment 
may be traced to his unusual respect for the thought processes not only of 
ordinary persons but also of persons at the margins of society. Kalven did 
not argue that dissenters ought to be tolerated, he argued that they ought to 
be heard. He fought tirelessly in the law journals against those who would 
require that acts of expression satisfy minimum standards of rationality and 
civility in order to qualify for First Amendment protection. He believed that 
the freedom of speech belongs to the inarticulate and the angry as well as to 
the loyal and respectful opposition. His writings abound with sympathetic 
translations distilling messages of social and cultural protest from expressive 
endeavors that others would dismiss as self-indulgent or coercive rantings. 
He did not think that “crackpots” and “subversives” and “extremists” deserve 
First Amendment protection because they are harmless. He thought they 
deserve protection because they have something to say that ought to be heard 
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in a democratic society. Kalven’s passion for free speech was a product of his 
curiosity and his humility, not any sense of noblesse oblige.
Strong proponents of free speech are often somewhat disengaged from the 
struggles of their time, or sympathetic to the messages the dominant forces 
seek to suppress, or so rigid in their embrace of principle that they become 
more or less heedless of consequences. Kalven was none of the above. He 
wanted to hear the voices of protesters, even the voices of fanatics, precisely 
because he was an engaged, moderate, perceptive, and practical participant in 
the controversies of his day. He thought that vigorous, fundamental challenge 
contributes to understanding and effective adaptation.
He conducted his classroom in accordance with this belief. I have never 
seen a teacher work so hard to elicit the “counter-argument” to whatever idea 
he was proposing. He wanted the counter-arguments stated persuasively and 
developed with imagination and respect. Seldom have I heard the arguments 
for censorship presented so well as they were in his class.
His unfeigned interest in uncongenial ideas, his openness to challenge at 
the most elementary level, proved to be a pedagogic boon. Because he brought 
to the classroom a desire to learn as well as teach, he could introduce a subject 
more sincerely, and more energetically, than any teacher I have known. One 
classmate said of his teaching: “He begins each hour doing algebra and ends 
each hour doing calculus.” The key point here, however, is that he found the 
algebra fascinating. 
Unlike most legal scholars who have reshaped their fields, Kalven 
employed the individual case as the essential unit of his creative thought. 
Probably the finest article written about his contributions to First Amendment 
scholarship, by Kenneth Karst, is aptly entitled “An Appreciative Comment 
on the Advantages of Thinking Small.”21 In his famous article on New York 
Times v. Sullivan, Kalven writes as a “torts teacher” grappling with “the dizzying 
consequence” of a landmark Supreme Court case “transmuting a part of his 
domain—one that he traditionally does not reach until the last day of the 
semester—into constitutional law, the Valhalla of the law school curriculum.”22 
He told our class that the First Amendment will never lack for brilliant 
philosophers, that what it will always need most is courageous, well-trained 
lawyers. He greatly admired the legal foot soldiers who devise and defend the 
procedures, presumptions, and burdens of proof that turn noble ideals into 
potent operational constraints.  
21. Kenneth L. Karst, The First Amendment and Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on 
the Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 UCLA L. Rev. 1 (1965).
22. Kalven, Jr., The New York Times Case, supra note 5, at 192. 
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I took detailed notes in his torts class and uncharacteristically managed 
not to lose the notebook. Twenty years later I found myself teaching torts. 
On rereading the notes a few years after I started teaching the subject, I was 
struck by how simple and straightforward were Kalven’s initial questions for 
each class period. My teaching of the subject had been more elliptical. I had 
truncated the introductions and jumped quickly to the hard questions and 
elaborate theories. One year I attempted to do it Kalven’s way. I started each 
hour with simple, basic questions, sometimes taken straight from his notes. It 
didn’t work. In my hands the technique was artificial. I learned that I can only 
teach spontaneously by moving as quickly as possible to the levels of analysis 
that most excite me. To my students’ detriment, I did not have the patience, 
the fascination with basic formulations, or the curiosity about the legal culture 
that he possessed. The experience made me realize that Kalven’s ability to 
think freshly—and excitedly—about some of the most familiar features of the 
legal landscape was one of his greatest attributes, both as a teacher and a 
scholar. His calculus was so sophisticated, so subtle, so original in large part 
because he loved his algebra so much.
One expression of his fascination with basics was his penchant for 
schematic exposition. A Kalven blackboard was certain to be covered with 
diagrams, matrices, even hand-drawn maps and pictures illustrating how an 
accident occurred. The practice was contagious. It became a game among my 
classmates to concoct new, ever more elaborate matrices, sometimes to the 
point of silliness. But he had the last laugh. In our lighthearted efforts to 
caricature Kalven’s teaching style we wound up noticing relationships and 
making connections on our own. I had assumed that his ability to induce us to 
think originally through graphic emulation was an unintended by-product of 
his schematizing impulse. But when he sent me off to begin my own teaching 
career, his parting advice was: “Use visual aids.” From this conversation 
I learned that he was, after all, a self-aware and calculating pedagogue. He 
employed visual aids to challenge students, not to comfort them. He simplified 
in order to investigate complexities and he wanted his students to do the same.
This commerce between the simple and the complex, between the beginning 
student and the scholar at the forefront of his specialty, was central to Harry 
Kalven’s view of knowledge and the process of discovery. He allocated his 
time accordingly. One day he appeared in our First Amendment class seeming 
exasperated and exhausted: “Don’t ever,” he said “try to teach proximate cause 
and obscenity in the same week.” An accident of scheduling had caused him 
to be covering the most philosophically challenging and doctrinally confusing 
topic in the torts course at the same time he was tackling perhaps the most 
perplexing segment of the First Amendment course. But he had been teaching 
those subjects and writing renowned articles on them for years. The comment 
revealed how hard he prepared for class each time he taught a subject, not 
just by considering strategies of presentation but by rethinking his views on 
the merits seriously enough to be tired and frustrated and confused. He may 
have spent his time this way out of a sense of responsibility to his students, 
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but I think more was involved. I am convinced that to an unusual degree his 
writing grew out of his teaching, that he knew of no better way to grapple with 
a subject than to think about it with a group of students—and to do so without 
holding back.
People often behave in a manner that reflects the expectations others have 
of them. Kalven treated his students as fellow explorers. His classes were 
open-ended conversations. That is why some students found the class sessions 
insufficiently structured, the points that emerged insufficiently conclusive. But 
open-ended conversations have a way of continuing. And students who are 
treated like original thinkers tend to keep thinking for themselves. And so, 
Harry Kalven’s teaching endures. 
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